PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC V RAMOLETE

G.R. No. L-60887 | November 13, 1991 | J. Feliciano

Facts:

On June 1976, a Cimarron PUJ owned by Nelia Enriquez, and driven by Cosme Casas, was travelling from Cebu City to Danao City. While passing through Liloan, Cebu, the Cimarron PUJ collided with a private jeep owned by the late Calixto Palmes (husband of private respondent Primitiva Palmes) who was then driving the private jeep. The impact of the collision was such that the private jeep was flung away to a distance of about thirty (30) feet and then fell on its right side pinning down Calixto Palmes. He died as a result of cardio-respiratory arrest due to a crushed chest. The accident also caused physical injuries on the part of 2-year-old Adeudatus Borbon.

Private respondents Primitiva and Honorato Borbon, Sr. (father of Adeudatus) filed a complaint against Cosme and Nelia before the then Cebu CFI claiming actual, moral, nominal and exemplary damages as a result of the accident. The claim of Borbon, Sr. was excluded from the complaint due to jurisdiction.

The CFI ruled in favor of Primitiva, ordering common carrier Nelia to pay her damages and attorney’s fees. The judgment of the trial court became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued, which however, returned unsatisfied, prompting the court  to summon and examine Nelia. She declared that the Cimarron PUJ was covered by a third-party liability insurance policy issued by petitioner Perla.

Palmes then filed a motion for garnishment praying that an order of garnishment be issued against the insurance policy issued by petitioner in favor of the judgment debtor. Respondent Judge then issued an Order directing the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to garnish the third-party liability insurance policy. Petitioner filed for MR and quashal of the writ of garnishment on the ground that Perla was not a party to the case and that jurisdiction over its person had never been acquired by the trial court by service of summons or by any process. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion.An Order for issuance of an alias writ of garnishment was subsequently issued.

More than two (2) years later, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed with this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering garnishment of the third-party liability insurance contract issued by petitioner Perla in favor of the judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez. The Petition should have been dismissed forthwith for having been filed way out of time but, for reasons which do not appear on the record, was nonetheless entertained.

 

Issue:

W/N there is GADALEJ on the part of the respondent judge

W/N there insurance policy may be subject to garnishment

 

Held:

1. No. The SC found no grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of or without jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering the garnishment of the judgment debtor’s third-party liability insurance.

2. Yes. Garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment for reaching any property or credits pertaining or payable to a judgment debtor. In legal contemplation, it is a forced novation by the substitution of creditors: the judgment debtor, who is the original creditor of the garnishee is, through service of the writ of garnishment, substituted by the judgment creditor who thereby becomes creditor of the garnishee. Garnishment has also been described as a warning to a person having in his possession property or credits of the judgment debtor, not to pay the money or deliver the property to the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff’s suit.

In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment.

Rule 39, Section 15 and Rule 57, Section 7(e) of the ROC themselves do not require that the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable.

In the present case, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the trial court actually acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Perla when it was served with the writ of garnishment of the third-party liability insurance policy it had issued in favor of judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez. Perla cannot successfully evade liability thereon by such a contention.

In a third-party liability insurance contract, the insurer assumes the obligation of paying the injured third party to whom the insured is liable. The insurer becomes liable as soon as the liability of the insured to the injured third person attaches. Prior payment by the insured to the injured third person is not necessary in order that the obligation of the insurer may arise. From the moment that the insured became liable to the third person, the insured acquired an interest in the insurance contract, which interest may be garnished like any other credit.

A separate action is not necessary to establish petitioner’s liability.

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time and for lack of merit. Judgment AFFIRMED.

CITIZENS SURETY AND INSURANCE CO V MELENCIO-HERRERA

L- 32170 (38 SCRA 369) | March 31, 1971

Facts:

Citizens Surety and Insurance Co (Citizens) alleged that at the request of Santiago Dacanay, it issued 2 surety bonds to guarantee payment of P5K promissory notes  in favor Gregorio Fajardo and  Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co respectively. As security, the Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed an Indemnity Agreement to jointly indemnify Citizens for losses, costs and expenses (with 12% annual interest) and a REM over a parcel of land in Baguio. The Dacanays failed to pay the promissory notes compelling Citizens to pay. The Dacanays failed to reimburse Citizens however, forcing the latter to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and file a case to recover the unsatisfied balance.

At petitioner’s request, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the Philippines Herald. But despite such publication and deposit of copy with the Manila post office, the defendant did not appear within 60 days from the last publication.

Plaintiff sought the defendants to be declared in default, but the Judge eventually dismissed the case, the suit being in personam and the defendants not having appeared.

Issue:

W/N summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction
Held:

No. In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot – consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights – confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.

The proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them two be attached, in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may be valid.

Given the skill of debtors to conceal their properties however, the decision of the respondent Judge should be set aside and held pending in the archives until petitioner tracks down the whereabouts of the defendant’s person or properties.

PEOPLE V BLANCAFLOR

G.R. No. 130586 | January 29, 2004 | J. Austria-Martinez

Facts: 

On the early morning of the last week of July, 1995, the mother of fourteen-year-old Mylene Rueda, who was a fish vendor and about to leave their home at dawn, woke her up and asked her to transfer from the floor where she (Mylene) was sleeping, to the bed where her four-year old brother slept. Mylene then transferred and slept on the bed. At around 3:30 or 4:00 that same morning, she was again roused from sleep when she felt her stepfather Francisco Blancaflor on top of her, with his penis already at the entrance of her vagina. She could not do anything as her hands were pinned against appellant’s chest and he was threatening to kill all of them with a gun that was then just beside him.

It took her three weeks before Mylene finally gathered the courage to tell her mother about the incident. Mylene’s mother and appellant quarreled about the matter, but soon after, the two were in talking terms again and the matter was resolved with a mere promise from appellant that he will not do it again. Appellant, however, went on touching Mylene’s private parts whenever he had a chance but Mylene no longer reported the incidents to her mother as she was afraid.

Thus, it was only when Mylene finally told her high school class adviser Mrs. Adelaida Corla about her traumatic experience that she was eventually assisted in reporting the crime to the NBI and the case was filed in court. Custody over Mylene was also turned over to the DSWD.

Appellant claims that Mylene is merely fabricating the charge against him out of vindictiveness because he tried to discipline her for her bad conduct.

The Albay RTC found appellant Francisco Blancaflor guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer death penalty with damages, hence the automatic review of judgement in th case at bar.

Issue: 
W/N the testimonies of the complainant is worthy of belief

Held: 
Yes. Appellant posits that the uncorroborated testimony of complainant is weak and cannot be considered more convincing and rational than the defense presented by him because it took the latter fourteen months before she reported the alleged incident, that no evidence was made as to her resistance, and that the charge was only brought about by appellant’s efforts to discipline her.

At the outset, we emphasize the settled rule that the testimony of a rape victim of tender or immature age deserves full credit. At the time Mylene testified, she was a mere fifteen-year old girl. Furthermore, reading from the record, her testimony is clear, straightforward and bereft of material or significant inconsistencies. Hence, the trial court correctly found Mylene’s testimony to be deserving of full faith and credit.

Additionally, physical resistance need not be proved in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. It suffices that the intimidation produces fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not submit to the bestial demands of the accused, something worse would befall her at the time she was being molested.

The force or violence necessary in rape is a relative term that depends not only on the age, size, and strength of the persons involved but also on their relationship to each other. In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former’s parental authority and moral ascendancy over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation who, expectedly, would just cower in fear and resign to the father’s wicked deeds.

The argument on the delay of fourteen months in reporting and filing the case is without merit because the appellant exercised moral ascendancy over the underage complainant and that, after the latter failed to get the support of her mother after she reported the incident, she can hardly be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to authorities without the help of an adult.

The SC likewise finds it truly inconceivable for a girl of such tender years to be able to concoct a story, provide details of a rape and ascribe such wickedness to her “stepfather” just because she resents being disciplined by him, since by thus charging him, she would also expose herself to extreme humiliation, even stigma. Mylene’s credible testimony is unshaken by appellant’s weak claim that she was motivated by ill-will in accusing him of rape.

The credibility of complainant Mylene having been firmly established, the trial court did not err in finding appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt. However, for failure of the prosecution to properly allege in the Information the qualifying circumstance that the victim is under eighteen years of age and that the offender is a common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim, the special qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship could not be taken into consideration and appellant could only be found guilty of simple rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death on appellant. Judgement affirmed with modification.

PEOPLE V TAN LEE

G.R. No. 144312 | September 3, 2003 | J. Puno

Facts:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Manila RTC, finding the accused CHUA TAN LEE guilty of unlawfully selling 966.50 grams of shabu in a buy-bust operation conducted by the PNP Narcotics Group and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In the morning of November 12, 1998, a confidential informant arrived at the PNP Narcotics Group, Intelligence Division, in Camp Crame and reported to Chief Inspector Leonardo Suan about the illegal drug activities of accused CHUA TAN LEE, alias William Chua. After evaluating the report, Suan formed a buy-bust team composed of himself, SPO1 Romeo Velasquez, SPO1 Pongyan, Delos Santos and SPO3 Posero. Velasquez was to act as the poseur-buyer and the others as back-up members. The informant called up the accused and set-up a drug deal for the purchase of one (1) kilo of shabu worth P1.5M at the Harrison Plaza parking area in Malate, Manila, at 4PM. Velasquez prepared the P1.5M boodle money to be used in the buy-bust operation. It consisted of 15 bundles of newspaper pieces, cut into the size of paper money, each bundle representing P100,000.00. Suan gave him two (2) pieces of P1,000 bill which he put on top and at the bottom of the boodle. The boodle money was placed inside a paper bag.

The buy-bust team then proceeded to the designated parking area and waited for the accused who arrived in a red Toyota Corolla after about half an hour. Velasquez and the informant approached the accused’s car to meet the accused and secure the deal. Upon being assured of the good quality of the drugs and being handed the bag containing the shabu by th accused, Velasquez paid him with the boodle money, immediately scratched his nose as a signal to his back-up team that the deal was consummated, and then arrested the accused. SPO1 Pongyan recovered the boodle money from the accused and the team brought the accused to Camp Crame where Titong and Suan placed the money in the safekeeping cabinet.

The defense, however, sought to establish their theory of hulidap through the testimonies of the accused, his girlfriend Kin Yu and uncle Mauricio Sy Lim who alleged that after the couple failed to buy dried mangoes in Tutuban and opted instead to buy some pizza that they could eat on their way home, the accused was ganged upon by police officers who demanded a million pesos. Refusing to pay, accused was allegedly charged with illegal possession of regulated drugs.

Issue:
W/N the court erred in finding the accused guilty as charged

Held:
No. The appellant claims that the prosecution evidence is full of inconsistencies such as errors in the preparation of the documents relative to his arrest and allegedly erroneous details with regards the evidence. His contentions are without merit.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The testimonies of the buy-bust team established that an operation was legitimately and successfully carried out on November 12, 1998 to entrap appellant. The positive identification of appellant by poseur-buyer SPO1 Romeo Velasquez as the one who peddled the shabu unequivocally established the illicit sale as he is the best witness to the transaction. Moreover, his testimony was corroborated in every material detail by the other operatives who participated in the buy-bust operation.

The Court is not unaware that in drug-related cases, frame-up and “hulidap” are the common and standard line of defenses. In the case at bar, we find that the discrepancies cited by the appellant in support of his acquittal are immaterial and insufficient to reverse his conviction. It is settled that the exact date when the crime was committed need not be proved unless it is an essential element of the crime. Nonetheless, in this case, prosecution witnesses and anti-narcotics operatives Velasquez, Pongyan and Titong narrated in detail the events leading to the arrest of the appellant pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation. The wrong date of arrest, the description of the drugs being in a heat-sealed bag and the date in the boodle money also respectively appear to be a mere clerical error and a mistake.

There is also nothing in the records to show that the appellant identified by name or described the features of any of his supposed captors who he could not even easily identify during the officers’ appearance in open court. Judgment affirmed with modification as to the penalty of fine.

PEOPLE V SISTOSO

G.R. Nos. 131867-68 | July 31, 2002 | J. Bellosillo

Facts:

Laureano Sistoso alias Yayan who was convicted by the trial court of qualified rape on two (2) counts, sentenced to death for each count and ordered to indemnify complaining witness Rosita Gomonit, his stepdaughter, P100,000.00 in damages seeks a reversal of his conviction in the case at bar.

The first rape happened in the morning of November 13, 1995 in Bohol when Rosita looked after her two younger siblings while her mother, Aniceta Sistoso, went to the market for their weekly provisions. Her stepfather Laureano Sistoso kept them company while Aniceta was away.

At around 9AM while Rosita was putting her siblings to sleep, Laureano suddenly approached her from behind and with a scythe on hand ordered her to take off her clothes. She pleaded to her stepfather to stop molesting her but she could not deter him from successfully having sexual intercourse with her and threatening to hurt her and her whole family if she reported the incident to anyone. Rosita then secretly tried to leave for grandmother’s house in Tagbilaran City but was stopped by her mother and Laureano. Laureano then threatened her again if she squealed.

Sometime in January 1996 or almost a month after, Rosita finally confided to her mother but the latter refused to believe her and sided instead with Laureano prompting Rosita to keep her ordeal to herself.

In the early Monday morning in February 1996, the rape was repeated.

On September 1996 when Laureano who was drunk, he chased everyone in the family with a slingshot. Perhaps realizing that what her daughter earlier told the truth, Aniceta finally accompanied her daughter to the municipal hospital for medical examination and filed two (2) criminal complaints for rape against Laureano in behalf of her minor daughter Rosita. Pending preliminary investigation, Laureano was arrested.

The sight of Laureano in prison however changed Aniceta’s mind prompting her to recant her testimony and file an affidavit of desistance. Before Rosita could sign the affidavit of desistqnce from her mother, the DSWD intervened, took the child under its protective custody and sent her to live with her maternal grandmother Consorcia Aniniput.

Aniceta, however, kept hounding Rosita to withdraw the charges against Laureano and even threatened her with a bolo. Undeterred, Rosita pursued the cases. Sistoso denied the accusations and claimed that the charges were his wife’s plan to falsely accuse her husband to stop him from leaving. Aniceta admitted such claim and even accused her own mother Consorcia of sexually abusing Rosita and had Rosita’s younger sister claim that Rosita’s defloration was caused by own masturbation.

Issue:
W/N the court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape

Held:
No. In this appeal, accused-appellant Laureano Sistoso argues that Rosita’s accusations of rape should not be taken as conclusive in the face of the testimonies offered by her mother Aniceta and her sister Rosario.

However, nothing is better settled in our jurisprudence than that the conclusions of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed on appeal unless the court a quo is perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight which if properly assessed would warrant a reversal of the questioned decision.

Certainly, Rosita’s testimony is straightforward, categorical and convincing compared to the implausible declarations by her mother and flaccid explanation of her stepfather. It is indeed implausible that for a petty quarrel, a mother would concoct a tale of sexual abuse, bring her family into a lifelong grief and embarrassment and imperil her daughter’s honor and future. Besides, courts generally look with disfavor upon recanted testimonies.

However, the trial court erred in imposing upon accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death. To warrant the death penalty, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the accused must be both alleged and proved.

Although the minority of the victim and her relationship with accused-appellant in these cases were alleged in the Informations, they were not sufficiently proved at the trial. The prosecution did not present Rosita’s birth certificate to establish her age and filiation as well as the marriage certificate of Aniceta and Laureano to establish private complainant’s relationship with accused-appellant, although this may not be absolutely necessary as common law relationship between them may be enough. The admission of accused-appellant that Rosita was his minor stepdaughter, he being married to her mother, did not meet the required standard of proof. Since it is the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused which qualifies the rape as a heinous crime that warrants the imposition of the death penalty, accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Judgment affirmed with modification as to penalty.

RAMIREZ V CA

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

 

Issue:

W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

 

Held:

Yes.  Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,  or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA

G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

 

Facts:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

 

Issue:

W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals

 

Held:

1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

GANAAN V IAC

G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:

W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200

Held:

No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

AGUSTIN V CA

G.R. No. 162571 | June 15, 2005 | J. Corona

 

Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

 

Issue:

W/N  the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD

W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search

 

Held:

1. No.  The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.

2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

PEOPLE V TURCO

G.R. No. 137757 | August 14, 2000 | J. Melo

 

Facts:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea’s face, placed his right hand on the latter’s neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea’s private part despite Escelea’s resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts.

The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

 

Issue:

W/N the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape

W/N the appellant’s contention that the medical certificate may not be considered is with merit

 

Held:

1. No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower court’s finding of credibility in the testimony and evidence presented by the victim, and finds the appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Yes. With regards to appellant’s argument on the proof of medical certificate, while the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.