COSETENG V MITRA

G.R. No. 86649 | July 12, 1990 | J.Griño-Aquino

Facts:

Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:

W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:

Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because revision in House representation in CA was based on proportional representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.

DEMETRIA V ALBA

G.R. No. 71977 | February 27, 1987 | J. Fernan

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

Issue:

1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional

2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

Held:

1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.

Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

ATIENZA V BOARD OF MEDICINE

G.R. No. 177407 | February 9, 2011 | J. Nachura

Facts:

1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 1995.

2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. She underwent kidney operation after the tests revealed that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing.

3. Private respondent’s husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine for the removal of Editha’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who allegedly participated in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of documentary evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-Ray request forms where interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated.

5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Editha’s formal offer of exhibits, alleging that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, intended to establish matters which are hearsay, and incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was admitted by the BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied on the ground that BOM should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case, and later on determine whether the evidence is relevant or not.

7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence

Held:
No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that, “it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.”

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced in light of Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure. As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable presumptions.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection with Editha’s medical case, which contained handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her “kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time” of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys because the position and removal may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed, especially as one of the witnesses testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits “because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building” and ultimately, the originals cannot be produced.

MANILA MINING CORP. V MIGUEL TAN

G.R. No. 171702 | February 12, 2009 | J. Quisumbing

Facts:

1. Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing, was engaged in the business of selling electrical materials.

2. Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from Tan valued at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or be charged interest of 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the same, to pay attorney’s fees equal to 25% of the claim.

3. MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it failed to give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was covered by nine invoices.

4. Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC. After Tan completed presenting evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC denied. RTC further directed MMC to present evidence.

5. MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to present the original sales invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence of stamp marks on the invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMC’s representatives.

6. On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of MMC’s account. De los Santos testified that he delivered the originals of the invoices and purchase orders to MMC’s accounting department. As proof, he showed three customer’s acknowledgment receipts bearing the notation:

I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you for the period and the amount stated below, together with the corresponding original copies of the invoices, purchase order and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification, bearing acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods.

7. The RTC ruled for Tan and ordered defendant to pay the principal amount with interest and liquidated damages. MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the RTC.

8. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.

9. Petitioner contends, among others, that respondent’s claim for payment was premature inasmuch as the original invoices and purchase orders were not sent to its accounting department. Consequently, Tan’s claims were not verified and processed. MMC believes that mere delivery of the goods did not automatically give rise to its obligation to pay, in light of Article 1545 of the Civil Code, which provides that, “where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition.…”

10. Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial, claiming that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence Rule and that by Tan’s failure to yield the original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed evidence under Section 3(e),15 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
W/N MMC should pay for the electrical materials despite its allegation that Tan failed to comply with certain requisites for payment

Held:

Yes. Petition denied for lack of merit. Petitioner poses a question of fact which is beyond this Court’s power to review. This Court’s jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the Court of Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully established rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial court, are accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding on this Court.

In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted offers when Tan supplied the electrical materials to MMC. Hence, petitioner cannot evade its obligation to pay by claiming lack of consent to the perfected contracts of sale. The invoices furnished the details of the transactions.

As regards respondent’s failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue. Where the existence of the writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced in proof. MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention was that Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale between the parties.

WONG WOO YIU V VIVO

G.R. No. L-21076 | March 31, 1965 | J. BAUTISTA ANGELO

 

Doctrine:

Laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

 

Facts:

1. The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant, which was later on affirmed by the Board of Commissioners.
2. However, the same Board, composed of a new set of members, reversed BSI No. 3 and ordered petitioner to be excluded from the country.
3. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was denied for lack of merit. She then filed the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction (considered as certiorari) before the Manila CFI.
4. After the respondents filed their answer and the parties submitted a written stipulation of facts, the court a quo declared valid the original decision and restrained respondents from excluding petitioner from the country. Respondents interposed the present appeal.
5. It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that the new set of Board of Commissioners found that petitioner’s claim was without basis, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.

 

 

Issue:

W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of her marriage and can thus be admitted as non-quota immigrant in the country?

 

Held:

No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband in the investigations conducted by the immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in support of petitioner’s claim that she is Blas’ wife is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship.

Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.

But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Decision appealed from reversed.

SABENA BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES V CA

G.R. No. 104685 | March 14, 1996 | J. VITUG

 

Doctrine:

– Art. 1733 of the [Civil] Code provides that from the very nature of their business and by reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them.

– Art. 1735 establishes the presumption that if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they had observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.

– The Warsaw Convention denies to the carrier availment ‘of the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct,’ or ‘if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.’

 

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Ma. Paula San Agustin, herein private respondent, was a passenger on board Flight SN 284 of defendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to Manila. She checked in her luggage which contained her valuables, namely: jewelries valued at $2,350.00; clothes $1,500.00; shoes/bag $150; accessories $75; luggage itself $10.00; or a total of $4,265.00, for which she was issued Tag No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage was left on board Flight SN 284.
2.  She arrived at Manila International Airport and immediately submitted her Tag No. 71423 but her luggage was missing.  She was advised to accomplish and submit a property Irregularity Report which she submitted and filed on the same day but when her luggage could not be found, she filed a formal complaint with defendant’s Local Manager.
3. Subsequently, plaintiff was furnished copies of telexes of defendant’s Brussel’s Office that the latter found her luggage and that they have broken the locks for identification. Plaintiff was assured by the defendant that it has notified its Manila Office that the luggage will be shipped to Manila. But unfortunately plaintiff was informed that the luggage was lost for the second time.
4. Plaintiff demanded from the defendant the money value of the luggage and its contents or its exchange value, but defendant refused to settle the claim. Defendant asserts in its Answer and its evidence tend to show that while it admits that the plaintiff was a passenger with a piece of checked in luggage, the loss of the luggage was due to plaintiff’s sole if not contributory negligence.
5. Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of private respondent should be considered the primary cause for the loss of her luggage, avers that, despite her awareness that the flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and that her flight from Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage upon arrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent, being a seasoned international traveler, must have likewise been familiar with the standard provisions contained in her flight ticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that the liability of the airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event, to only US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and corresponding additional charges are paid thereon.  At the Casablanca International Airport, private respondent, in checking in her luggage, evidently did not declare its contents or value, pursuant to Section 5(c), Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, which states that: “Passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or other valuables.”
6.  The trial court rendered judgment ordering Sabena Belgian World Airlines to pay private respondent. Sabena appealed but the CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s judgment, hence the present petition for review.

 

Issue:

W/N the airline is liable for the lost luggage

 

Held:

Yes. Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is demanded by the nature of an obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place.  When the source of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere breach or non-fulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part of the obligor.  This rule is not different in the case of common carriers in the carriage of goods which, indeed, are bound to observe not just the due diligence of a good father of a family but that of “extraordinary” care in the vigilance over the goods.

The only exceptions to the foregoing extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier is when the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is due to any of the following causes:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.’

Not one of the above excepted causes obtains in this case.

The airline cannot invoke the tort doctrine of proximate cause because the private respondent’s luggage was lost while it was in the custody of petitioner. The “loss of said baggage not only once by twice,” said the appellate court, “underscores the wanton negligence and lack of care” on the part of the carrier. The above findings foreclose whatever rights petitioner might have had to the possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers under the Warsaw Convention.

In Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that “the Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment ‘of the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct,’ or ‘if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.’

The Hague Protocol amended the Warsaw Convention by removing the provision that if the airline took all necessary steps to avoid the damage, it could exculpate itself completely, and declaring the stated limits of liability not applicable ‘if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result.’ The same deletion was effected by the Montreal Agreement of 1966, with the result that a passenger could recover unlimited damages upon proof of wilful misconduct.

The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline’s liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. It should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury. Decision appealed from AFFIRMED.

ROSARIO DARANG V PEDRO TY BELIZAR, ET AL

G.R. No. L-19487 | January 31, 1967 | J. REGALA

Facts:

1. Rosario Darang is a holder of a certificate of public convenience to maintain a bus transportation line between MacArthur-Balangiga and MacArthur-Guiuan in the province of Samar.

2. Pedro Ty Belizar is also engaged in the public utility business for the transportation of passengers and freight by means of trucks between several towns in the same province but not on the MacArthur-Balangiga line.

3. Andres Salamida was, by decision of the Public Service Commission, authorized to maintain bus transportation line on the MacArthur-Balangiga and MacArthur-Guiuan lines.

4. The PSC decision was, however, contested by Darang and Fortunato Macabasag, by filing a petition for review and certiorari with preliminary injunction in the SC, on the ground that said oppositors were not given the opportunity to present surrebuttal evidence in the PSC. (SC CASE)

5. Before the filing of the petition for certiorari, however, Darang filed a complaint with the PSC against Belizar for encroaching on her line without authority to do so under the Public Service Act. (PSC CASE)

6. At about the same time that she and Macabasag filed the petition for review with SC, Darang instituted a civil case before the Samar CFI, alleging, among others, (1) that Belizar, connived with Salamida, in illegally operating and soliciting passengers and cargoes along the lines of Gen. MacArthur, Quinapundan, Giporlos and Balangiga in spite of frequent prohibitions by the PSC; (2) that Salamida, by means of a simulated Deed of Transfers of Motor Vehicles, has caused the transfer in his name of certain motor vehicles, which he purports to run the said lines; (3) that these vehicles are now in full operation soliciting passengers and cargoes notwithstanding the fact that the same has been withdrawn from the operation for public service by Belizar before the PSC; (4) that the continuance of the illegal acts of defendants would work injustice and prejudice to the rights of the plaintiff.

7. A writ of preliminary injunction was granted upon the filing of the complaint.

8. After hearing, the CFI held that Salamida failed to register the trucks, allegedly bought by him from Belizar with the Motor Vehicles Registrar, the supposed certificates of registration being null and void for the reason that they have not been property accomplished; that the trucks in question have been registered in the records of the PSC in the names of Belizar and Salamida which shows that the deeds of sale are fictitious; that another reason for declaring the sale of the trucks null and void is the lack of a previous approval by the Commission of the said transaction; that Andres Salamida failed to have the trucks, to be operated by him, registered in his name 30 days from receipt of the copy of said decision; and that Andres Salamida had infringed the seventh condition of his certificate of public convenience for he operated the trucks in question without tickets or stub.

9. The Court thus rendered judgment prohibiting Belizar from engaging any truck for public utility in the transportation of passengers and freight between MacArthur and Balangiga until he may obtain from the PSC the corresponding certificate of public conveniences; enjoining the said Salamida from operating his certificate until he shall have complied with the law and the rules, and regulations of the PSC and the conditions imposed upon him by the decision and the Motor Vehicles Act; condemning the defendants to indemnify plaintiff moral and exemplary or corrective damages; prohibiting the Motor Vehicles Registrar Andres Sajol from registering the trucks in the name of Salamida until the latter shall have fully complied with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the conditions specified in his certificate of public convenience and the Public Service Act on the matter.

ISSUE:

1. W/N CFI has jurisdiction to try the case
2. W/N the previous approval of PSC is condition precedent for sale of truck

HELD:

1. Yes. The appellants contend that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the complaint for injunction filed before it, there being other cases involving the same parties and subject matter filed and then pending with this Court and the PSC. Comparing the three cases, we reiterate that the PSC case was a complaint directed against Belizar for encroaching on the line of operation of Darang. The SC case was a petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction against the decision of the PSC granting Salamida’s application for a certificate of public convenience to operate an auto-bus service along the Guiuan-MacArthur-Quinapundan-Giporlos-Balangiga route in Samar with six units.

Neither are the parties nor the issues involved in these cases the same. With the dissimilarities in the three cases, it cannot be correctly said that the CFI lacks jurisdiction over this case which involves mainly the validity of the deed of sale of the trucks to Salamida. In fact, this would not be a proper question for the determination of the PSC.

2. No. Section 16(h) of Act 3108, which states that no public utility, without the approval of the Public Utility Commission, has the power to sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, franchise or any of its rights or privileges, has been superseded by section 20 (g) of Commonwealth Act 146 or Public Service ActCommonwealth Act 146, which reads:

… Provided, however, That nothing shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of its business.

The presumption is that the law-making body did not change the substantial words in the pre-existing law without intending to change its meaning. The change then in the wording of the law affected not only the form but the very substance of the provision. While in the old law the sale without the approval of the Public Utility Commission was declared null and void, under Commonwealth Act 146, the new law, the sale may not only be negotiated but completed before said approval. In other words, the approval by the Commission is not a condition precedent to the validity of the contract. The approval is only necessary to protect public interest. At any rate, the above analysis would not alter the conclusion made by the court below that the sale of the three trucks is null and void for the other reasons stated therein, which are not questioned in this appeal.

Decision affirmed in all respects except the award of damages which should merely be exemplary.

CALALANG V INTESTATE ESTATE OF TANJANGCO

FACTS:

1. Calalang is the grantee of legalislative franchise approved under RA 2290 to construct, operate, and maintain an ice plant and cold storage in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
2. Pursuant to the franchise, petitioner filed an application with the Public Service Commission for the issuance of the corresponding certificate of public convenience.
3. However, about 3 weeks before petitioner filed her application with PSC, Aurora Tanjangco, administratix of I.E. of Gervacio Tanjangco, an established operator of an ice plant in Hagonoy, filed with PSC an application to increase the capacity of her ice plant from 10 to 40 tons.
4. Believing that the grant of Tanjangco’s application would nullify the legislative franchise granted her to operate an ice plant and that as grantee, she has the preferred right to serve the public need, petitioner entered an opposition and later on moved for joint hearing of both her and Tanjangco’s applications.
5. PSC issued an order overruling Calalang’s opposition and also denied her petition for joint hearing, in the belief that Calalang’s legislative franchise, being conditioned on PSC’s issuance of certificate of public conveniece, did not invest her with any right as an operator to oppose the application.
6. Calalang filed MR, which was denied, hence the present petition for certiorari charging the PSC Commissioner Aspillera with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner, as granee of a legislative franchise should be allowed to oppose the Tanjanco’s application

HELD:

Yes. The test in determining whether a person has sufficient interst or personality to interve in any proceedings before the PSC has been laid down as follows: “ He must show…that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, an injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. His interest must be of such nature as to be susceptible of valuation.

Indeed, when petitioner was granted the franchise in question by the Legislature, we can assume that the body had already made a prima facie finding of public necessity for the operation of an additional ice plant service….and of petitioner’s possesing the necessary qualifications. Under this franchise, petitioner has thus acquired the right to operate an ice plant, subject only to the conditions mentioned in the franchise Act.

Order reversed.

CHAMBER OF FILIPINO RETAILERS V VILLEGAS

G.R. No. L-29819 | April 14, 1972 | J. JBL REYES

 

Facts:

1. On July 25, 1968, City Ordinance No. 6696 was approved raising the Market Stall fees to be charged in all City Markets.
2. Petitioners brought action questioning the legality of this ordinance on the ground that the City Charter of Manila only authorizes the collection of “fees” and the rise in market stall fees would make this a source of revenue.
3. On October 4, 1968, while this case was pending, the Municipal Board approved Ordinance No. 6767 lowering the market stall fees as provided for by Ordinance No. 6696, but still much higher than the old rate.

 

Issue:

1. W/N the enactment of Ordinance No. 6767 was in the exercise of the governmental or the proprietary function of the city, it being agreed by the parties that if the enactment was “governmental”, the city may only collect such fees as would cover supervision of the market stalls, but, if “proprietary”, the city may charge said fees for revenue purposes
2. W/N City of Manila can charge fees for the use of its public markets without the approval of the Public Service Commission

 

 

Held:

1. No. We see no merit in this appeal. For assuming, ad arguendo, the correctness of appellant’s view that under its section 18 (cc) the Manila Charter, only authorizes the City of Manila to charge reasonable fees for the use of public markets, in an amount sufficient to cover the cost of supervision, maintenance and regulation, still this power was broadened by the subsequent Republic Act No. 2264 (the so-called Local Autonomy Act) section 2 of which grant all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts — “authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business or exercising privileges in chartered cities, municipalities or municipal districts …”

Since it is not deniable that persons selling in public markets are engaged in occupation or business (in the sense of engaging human activity for gain), it becomes plain that the city can impose at present upon market vendors or retailers fees designed to obtain revenue for the city, above or in addition to the amount needed to reimburse it for strictly supervisory services.

In the second place, there is a clear difference between the license to sell within the premises of public markets and the privilege of doing business at a definite location or stall in said market for a definite period of time. The permit to exercise the latter privilege partakes of the nature of a lease of the area occupied by the stall which is patrimonial property of the City of Manila. The renting by the City of its private property is a patrimonial activity or proprietary function, and in this sphere, the city — “like any private owner, it is … free to charge such sums as it may deem best, regardless of the reasonableness of the amount fixed, for the prospective lessees are free to enter into the corresponding contract of lease, if they are agreeable to the terms thereof, or, otherwise, not enter into such contract.”

And it is idle for appellants to contend that public markets are for public use, hence not patrimonial property susceptible of lease. It is not certainly for public use so far as the appellant stall market vendors are concerned, the city charter authorizing a charge for their use of public markets (ante).

 

2. No. While a public market is a public service or utility, it is not one that falls under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, not being ejusdem generis with those public services enumerated in Section 13(b) of the Public Service Act over which the Commission has jurisdiction. Hence the approval by the Commission of the fees fixed by the City of Manila for the use of its markets is not covered by Section 20 of the Public Service Act. And even if appellants had cited (which they did not) Republic Act 2677, amending the Public Service Act, by exempting any instrumentality of the National Government from securing a certificate of public convenience and necessity, but affirming the Commission’s power of regulation over public service utilities operated by government entities, except with respect to fixing of rates,  the amendatory statute could not have helped the theory of the appellants (that Manila cannot fix fees for the use of its public markets without the approval of the Commission), for the reason that public markets are not among (or not similar to) those utilities over which the Commission was vested with jurisdiction.

VENERACION V CONGSON ICE PLANT & COLD STORAGE

G.R. Nos. L-31213-14 | July 23, 1973 | J. Teehankee

Facts:

1. Petitioner is the holder of various certificates of public convenience and necessity under which he has long operated ice plants located in General Santos City, as well as 2,250 cubic meter cold storage plant located in General Santos City, with authority to sell and distribute his ice production in the said city and in 12 municipalities of South Cotabato.

2. Private respondent filed 2 applications with respondent Public Service Commission (PSC) for a certificate of public convenience to install and operate a 40-to nice plant in General Santos City and to sell and distribute ice within 11 municipalities of South Cotabato (most of which were served by petitioner) and a 5,000-cubic meter cold storage plant in the same city.

3. PSC issued the required notice for both applications. Petitioner filed written oppositions, manifesting that his prior application for authority to increase the 15-ton capacity of his two ice plants in General Santos City by another 50-ton unit had already been submitted and was pending decision by respondent commission.

4. After several postponements, the applications were ordered dismissed in open court for failure of respondent-applicant and his attorney to appear at the scheduled hearing.

5. PSC through then associate commissioner Josue L. Cadiao issued an order lifting dismissal and resetting the hearing.

6. Strangely enough, respondent then filed an ex-parte motion for issuance of a provisional permit to operate the proposed services applied for. PSC without issuing a notice of hearing to petitioner-oppositor proceeded to receive ex-parte through a hearing officer respondent’s evidence issued by a 2 to 1 vote the provisional permit in favor of respondent.

7. Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued two days later a TRO enjoining PSC “from approving the plans and specifications for the ice plant and cold storage of respondent Congson…” and from further receiving any evidence in said PSC cases,” and respondent “from continuing with the construction, establishment and operation of the aforementioned ice plant and cold storage in General Santos City.”

Issue:
W/N PSC erred in granting ex-parte the provisional permit

Held:
Yes. In this appeal by certiorari, the Court sets aside the provisional permit granted ex-parte by respondent PSC on the ground that the commission in so allowing respondent to install and operate competing ice and cold storage plants deprived petitioner of his right to due process and exceeded its authority in so acting without a clear showing of an urgent public need that had to be met without notice and in disregard of petitioner’s right to be heard in opposition as an old operator, willing and able to adequately serve the public need.

The authority of respondent commission to issue ex-parte a provisional permit to operate proposed public services is not absolute, but is based on the superior and imperative necessity of meeting an urgent public need. Thus, were there clearly existed such an urgent need and the application could not be decided at once or resolution thereof was remote due to delay in the hearings caused by a series of postponements at oppositor’s instance, the Court has sanctioned ex-parte provisional permits for public services in order to satisfy the public necessity.

As pungently observed by then associate commissioner Panganiban in his dissent, the commission could not by any alchemy simply pronounce the existence of an urgent public need to warrant its ex-parte action in the face of the fact that petitioner has long operated an existing ice and cold storage service in the region. More, petitioner had in no way been remiss in his obligation to satisfy public need and had already submitted a prior application for a substantial increase of his ice-plant capacity which was already awaiting only the decision of the commission. Hence, if there did exist an urgent public need that would justify the issuance of a provisional permit, such provisional permit should in justice and fairness have been issued in favor of petitioner at the existing operator who had duly applied for an increase ahead of respondent.

As to an administrative tribunal such as respondent commission “that while it is ‘free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements,’ it does not mean ‘that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirement of due process… The ‘due process of law’ clause of the Constitution binds not only the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but also each and every one of its branches, agencies, etc.’